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Abstract
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the appropriateness of analog research designs in
the assessment ofmotivational distortion. The responses of analog experimental groups
instructed to fake-good (analog, n = 22) or respond honestly (classroom, n = 22) on the
Sixteen Personality Factor (16PF) 5th Edition were compared to the responses obtained from
a group of applicants to a graduate program in school psychology (applicant, n = 38).
Results indicate a consistent pattern of increasing score desirability across groups, from
classroom, to applicant, to analog, with significant differences (p<.002) between groups.
Thus, the applicability of analog research findings to applied settings is called into question
and Cattell's (1968,1986) trait-view theory is supported.
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A Comparison ofAnalog and Applied Setting Research Methods in Evaluating Motivational
Distortion
While self-report questionnaires are one of the most common methods used in the
assessment ofpersonality, the accuracy of their results is inherently dependent on the honesty of
the person being assessed (Schuerger, 1992). Thus, a test-taker can potentially influence the
results ofhis or her assessment by falsely responding to the items of any given personality
questionnaire. This phenomenon is broadly known as motivational distortion, or simply faking-
good. Cattell (1968) described distortions as stemming from an interaction between the test-
taker's personality and his or her reaction to the testing situation. This can occur either on the
unconscious level, unbeknownst to the test-taker, or as a result of a conscious decision to fake
one's responses. Paulhus (1984) confirmed this two-component view of social desirability using
factor analysis. This study, consisting ofmore than 150 items and scale totals from various
social desirability measures, indicated the presence of two primary factors: self-deception and
impression management. Further confirmatory factor analysis lent additional support to this
model of social desirability-related distortion by demonstrating its more adequate fit in
comparison to competing two-factor explanations (i.e., attribution/denial). Paulhus and Reid
(1991) elaborated on these two sources of response distortion. In self-deception, the distortion of
test-takers' responses is assumed to stem from an innate desire to present themselves in a
positive light to society in general. Impression management however, refers to intentional
response distortions intended to present a specific image of the test-taker to a specific audience.
While the latter source of distortion may seem more devious and threatening, it should be noted
that both self-deception and impression management lead to inaccurate representations of the
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test-taker's personality. Thus, they should both be taken into consideration when assessing
motivational distortion in any situation.
Burger (2000) explains that there are generally two broad types of impression
management distortions: socially-desirable responding, or faking-good, and malingering, or
faking-bad. Faking-good involves attempting to present oneself in a more favorable light by
responding in accordance with traits desirable in the situation at hand. This type of responding
might be found in situations where a personality assessment is given as part of an application
process for a job or for admission into college. In contrast, individuals who fake-bad respond in
a manner that depicts them as possessing more negative attributes than they actually have.
Faking-bad could possibly occur in situations such as a criminal trying to use an insanity
defense, or a psychiatric patient who does not want to leave a secure hospital environment.
In an extensive review of the research on motivational distortion, Merydith and
Wallbrown (1991) noted that as early as the turn of the
20th
century, psychologists measuring
personality have been aware of the potential for individuals to distort their responses in
accordance with specific tasks. This knowledge was applied in a practical sense in a classic
study by Meehl and Hathaway (1946). These researchers developed scales and procedures to
identify and correct for faking-good and faking-bad on theMinnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory (MMPI) which are still used today on the revised version, theMMPI-2 (Butcher,
Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989). The L (lie) scale assesses distortion by
presenting the test-taker with the opportunity to endorse a number of items describing highly
desirable, but extremely rare traits. If a high number of these items are endorsed, it is assumed
that the test-taker is distorting his or her responses to look good (faking-good) (Greene, 1991).
The F (infrequency) scale operates in a similar fashion by presenting items describing highly
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atypical, deviant traits. If a test-taker endorses a large number of these items, it is assumed that
he or she is intentionally trying to present as having some form of psychopathology (faking-bad).
TheK (correction) scale is designed to assist in the identification of test-takers who exhibit
significant psychopathology, but whose MMPI profiles are normal. Based on K scale scores,
clinicians can adjust five of the Clinical scale scores, Psychasthenia (7), Schizophrenia (8),
Hypochondriasis (1), Psychopathic Deviate (4), and Hypomania (9), to correct for distorted
responding (Greene, 1991).
Today, nearly all major objective self-report personality measures employ some method
to identify this threat to the validity of their results. The 5th edition of the 16 Personality Factor
(16PF) detects response distortions using the Impression Management (IM) scale (Russell &
Karol, 1993). This scale is comprised of 12 items designed to assess the degree to which a test-
taker endorses socially desirable attributes while denying attributes that are undesirable. High
IM scores indicate higher levels of response distortion and suggest that the examiner should
interpret the results of the test cautiously. Variables such as the reason for testing and the level
of importance of accurate results should be considered.
Conn and Rieke (1994) found that IM scale scores correlated with a number of the 16PF
Primary personality factors. In particular, they noted that individuals with high IM scores also
tended to have Primary factor scores that contributed to a Global score profile ofExtraversion,
lower Anxiety, and higher Self-Control. In turn, low IM scores were related to Global profiles of
Introversion, higher Anxiety, and lower Self-Control. Only the Reasoning (B), Dominance (E),
and Sensitivity (I) Primary factors were found to have no significant correlation with IM scores.
The
5th
edition differs from past versions of the 16PF in that there are no procedures for
correcting test results based on the output of the IM scale.
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Extensive research evaluating the validity ofmeasures designed to detect response
distortions, such as the L, F, andK, scales from MMPI-2, and the MD scale from earlier versions
of the 16PF, has indicated general support for their validity and usefulness. In a study
investigating the validity scales of the original MMPI, Grow, McVaugh, and Eno (1980) found
that as much as 81% of the variance associated with faking could be accounted for by utilizing
the various detection and correction measures built into the test. However, Grow and colleagues
did advocate a slightly modified use of the MMPI detection scales. Specifically, if an
individual's F scale score exceeds his or herK scale score by 7 or more, faking-bad is indicated,
or if theK scale score exceeds the F scale score by 1 1 ormore, faking-good is indicated. While
these
researchers'findings suggested adjusted applications of the detection measures for clinical
use, they continued to lend support to the use of the measures in general. Examining the newer
MMPI-2, Wetter, Baer, Berry, Smith, and Larsen (1992) found that the revised test's validity
scales were sensitive to both random responding and faking. Further, their results showed
promise for techniques using a combination of the F and VRIN (Variable Response
Inconsistency) scales to differentiate between distortions stemming from random responding and
those resulting from faking.
Numerous other studies (e.g., Cassissi & Workman, 1992; Bagby, Nicholson, & Buis,
1995) have yielded similar results, establishing a strong body of support for the utility ofvalidity
scales on theMMPI/MMPI-II. However, as Merydith, Humphreys, and Ebener (1997) point out,
most of the support for the validity of these scales is derived from studies using a common
analog design. Specifically, participants are randomly assigned to groups and instructed to
complete a given self-report measure either honestly, faking-bad, or faking-good. For example,
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in Austin's (1992) study on the MMPI-2, college student volunteers were assigned to fake-good,
fake-bad, and honest groups. The participants in the fake-bad group were instructed to complete
the MMPI-2 as if they were trying to increase their disability benefits or beat a criminal charge
using the insanity defense. The fake-good group was told to answer as if they were applying for
a job and were trying to make a good impression. The honest group was simply told to answer
truthfully. Both faking groups were instructed to fake in such a way so as to make it hard to tell
they were faking. Typically, detection measures are then found to clearly differentiate faked and
honest respondents. While the internal validity of this type of design is sound, the external
validity is questionable. Samples of college students may not be representative of the test-takers
in applied settings that measures of response distortion are used with. Therefore, it is unclear
whether the results of such studies can be generalized to applied settings where personality
measures are actually used.
An additional factor that should be considered when examining the utility of response
validity scales for use in applied situations is the possibility of coaching. That is, in some real-
world testing situations, test-takers may have gained prior knowledge of the existence of
response validity measures and/or how to beat them (Storm & Graham, 2000). In fact, Wetter
and Corrigan (1995) found that the majority of the law students and attorneys they surveyed felt
that it was their duty to prepare and educate their clients about response validity measures prior
to allowing them to take psychological assessments. Lees-Haley (1997) even reported an
instance where an attorney attempted to limit the amount of time his client was allowed to
undergo psychological assessment so as to limit the evaluator's ability to use methods other than
MMPI-2 to assess the client's condition and truthfulness. Further, Baer andMiller (2002) noted
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that even without the presence of attorneys, motivated individuals could conceivably do their
own research prior to undergoing psychological assessment by using books on psychological
testing available at many college or even public libraries. The possibility of coaching or prior
knowledge of validity scales becomes more concerning when the results of studies comparing
coached and un-coached responses and the utility ofvalidity scales for detecting them are
considered. Both Baer andMiller (2002) and Storm and Graham (2000) found that the ability of
the standard MMPI-2 validity scales to detect faked responses was significantly diminished when
respondents had received some kind of coaching on avoiding detection. Specifically, the latter
study found that overall predictive power of theMMPI-2 validity scales, which ranged from .83
to .96 when identifying un-coached fakers, decreased to a range of .54 to .86 when attempting to
classify coached fakers. Thus, the potential for coaching adds another concern for the validity of
studies using analog-only research designs.
Some studies have directly examined the effectiveness ofdistortion measures in applied
situations. Merydith, Humphreys and Ebener (1997) conducted a study using an older version of
the 1 6PF (form C) to determine if its Motivational Distortion (MD) scale and associated
correction procedures were appropriate to use with welfare recipients in mandatory employment-
related evaluations. It was assumed that these participants had real motivation to present
themselves in a socially desirable way, as their continued reception ofwelfare benefits was
dependent on their participation in the welfare-to-work program. These researchers found that in
general, the established detection and correction procedures were appropriate for use with the
welfare population. However, the established procedures did not account for the observed
relationship between high MD scores and lower scores on the Dominance (E) Primary factor.
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This finding was consistent with the results of an earlier study by Wallbrown, Reuter, and
Barnett (1989) examining the use of the MD scale with a sample of felons taking the 16PF
during sentence-review. Taken together, these findings indicate that perhaps the applied settings
used in the studies above tap into different motivations than the simulated faking situations
traditionally used to validate distortion scales, thus resulting in different response styles between
situations.
Such evidence begins to cast doubt on the appropriateness of studying motivational
distortion using only experimentally simulated groups of faking and honest respondents. Zickar
and Robie (1999) noted the problems inherent in trying to compare the type of faking found in
simulated studies to that found in real-world situations. These researchers compared simulated
faking and honest groups ofmilitary recruits using both validity scales and Item Response
Theory (IRT). Although they found significant differences between faking and honest groups,
especially with IRT methods, the researchers cautioned that the instructed faking they studied
was likely much less subtle than faking in real-world situations.
All of these findings regarding differences in experimentally induced and real-world
faking lend support to Cattell's (1968, 1986) trait-view theory. In this theory, Cattell proposes
that any distortion behavior that results in anything other than a true representation of the
individual stems from both the personality of the individual and the given situation. In addition,
he posits that distortions are multi-dimensional in nature. The latter position is elaborated and
delineated in Paulhus and Reid's (1991) description of distortions being comprised ofboth
unconscious self-deception and intentional, deliberate impression management. However, it is
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Cattell's (1968, 1986) description of the role of the situation in determining distortion that is
most relevant.
In his 1986 writing, Cattell notes that there are traditionally thought to be two types of
error in psychological testing: measurement errors and statistical inference errors. However, he
describes a third error, which he deems to be more serious in nature than either of the first two.
This error stems from "...the interpretation and use of the given numerical score"(Cattell, 1986,
p.497); in essence, the incorrect interpretation of test data. This error refers to the failure to see
all the complexities that lead to a test-taker responding in a given way. One must consider,
therefore, every component, including the situation in which the test is taken, in order to
accurately describe the response distortion present. In terms of socially desirable distortions,
Cattell asserts that what is accepted as a "desirable" attribute can change across levels of
specificity and situations. In the broadest sense, there are attributes desired by society as a
whole. Then there are attributes desired by specific peer or social groups. Finally, Cattell asserts
that there are attributes desirable for, and unique to every possible situation. With regard to
personality assessment, there are different types and amounts of response distortion unique to
different testing situations and purposes.
Cattell's (1968, 1986) trait-view theory, then, has serious implications for the study of
deliberate distortion in personality assessment. If situational variables do indeed significantly
alter the motives of the test-taker, and thereby the distortion tendencies of the test-taker as Cattell
suggests, then serious doubt is cast on the external validity of the traditional simulated faking
experimental design. The differences in situation between contrived simulations and applied
settings are easy to see and undeniable. The question then becomes one regarding differences in
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real-world situations. Does applying for a job elicit different motives for distortion than
applying for parole? These situations are considerably more difficult to tease apart. Finally,
when the implications ofCattell's theory are taken to their logical conclusion, it seems to suggest
that different norms are needed for every unique situation in order to obtain a truly accurate
measure of the motivational distortion present. In fact, Cattell (1968) has suggested that
situational norms should be developed for at least the most commonly encountered test-taking
situations (i.e., job application, correctional settings, etc.).
The results of studies examining faking in applied settings (e.g., Merydith et al., 1997;
Wallbrown et al., 1989) have provided some support for Cattell's (1968, 1986) theory. In
addition, a recent study by Stark, Chernyshenko, Chan, Lee, and Drasgow (2001) appears to lend
further support. This study used Item Response Theory (IRT) methods to examine the effects of
varied testing situations on the items and scales of the 16PF. Stark and his colleagues noted that
attempts to study faking in applied settings have generally taken two forms. One method
involves comparing groups ofjob-applicants with groups of non-applicants to ascertain
situational differences, while the second method examines dispositional components of faking by
comparing groups determined to be faking or honest based on their scores on some measure of
distortion, such as the IM scale.
Stark et al. employed both methods by using data from Institute ofPersonality and
Ability Testing from independent groups ofjob-applicants and non-applicants. Situational
comparisons were made between the two groups, while dispositional components were examined
by using IM scores to differentiate fakers and honest responders within each group. It was found
that the IM scale functioned differently across situations, leading Stark and colleagues to
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conclude that future research should not generalize results across applied situations. Instead,
they suggest that separate groups of applicants and non-applicants be compared to study the
effects of faking in each individual situation. These findings are congruent with Cattell's (1968,
1986) assertion that different situations elicit different styles of faking. However, Stark et al.'s
(2001) study, while comparing applicants and non-applicants, used data taken from a wide
variety of testing situations. The applicant sample was made up of data from a diverse range of
employment situations, while the non-applicant sample used data from counseling, experimental,
and developmental settings. However, no additional information is available about the
composition of either group. It seems possible then, that there may be significant differences in
response distortion between smaller, situationally-defmed groups. Recalling Cattell's (1986)
assertions, motivation to respond in a socially desirable manner exists at both broad levels, such
as one's culture/society, and at very specific levels, as determined by the particular situation at
hand. Thus, there is a need to evaluate motivational distortion in specific applied settings as
compared to experimentally contrived situations.
The purpose of the present study is to contrast motivational distortion effects in simulated
situations to that of specific applied settings. More specifically, this study intends to contrast
16PF profiles and IM scale scores from two applied settings to those from one experimental
condition where participants are asked to fake good. This will add to the growing body of
research on the effects of situational differences on elicited response distortions, and in turn,
examine the appropriateness ofusing simulation studies to develop and validate distortion
detection and correction techniques. In addition, this study will provide results which can be
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applied in evaluation ofCattell's (1968, 1986) trait-theory approach to personality and its
assessment.
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Method
Participants
This study used archival data from two primary groups ofparticipants: 28 school
psychology graduate students currently enrolled in a specialist-level program at a large
northeastern university, and 38 applicants to the same graduate program. Of the participants, 10
were male, and 56 were female.
Instrument
The 5th edition of the 16 Personality Factor questionnaire (16PF) (Russel & Karol, 1993)
was used as the personality measure for this study. The 16PF is a standardized, norm-referenced
measure of normal personality that provides a results profile based on 16 primary factors and 5
global factors (Conn & Reike, 1994). The 16 primary factors, warmth (A), reasoning (B),
emotional stability (C), dominance (E), liveliness (F), rule-consciousness (G), social boldness
(H), sensitivity (I), vigilance (L), abstractedness (M), privateness (N), apprehension (O),
openness to change (Ql), self-reliance (Q2), perfectionism (Q3), and tension (Q4), were
developed by Raymond B. Cattell (1945, as cited in Conn & Rieke, 1994) through an extensive
factor analysis of common descriptors ofhuman personality. The five global factors,
extraversion, anxiety, tough-mindedness, independence and self-control resulted from
intercorrelations among the primary factors.
The 1 6PF has been empirically shown to be a reliable and valid instrument for evaluating
personality (Conn & Rieke, 1994). Normative data for the
5th
edition was obtained from a sample
of2,500 people, with demographics matched to the 1990 U.S. Census. Temporal stability, as
established by two-week test-retestmethods, is reported to range from .69-.87 for the 16 primary
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scales and from .84-.91 for the five global scales using a two-week interval. Social Boldness
(H), Self-Reliance (Q2) are the most reliable primary factors, with reliabilities exceeding .85,
while Reasoning (B) and Emotional Stability (C) are the least reliable, with reliability estimates
of .69 and .75 respectively. Among the global factors, Extraversion is the most reliable, with a
reliability of .91 , while the Anxiety and Independence factors are the least reliable at .84. The
Tough-Mindedness and SelfControl factors have temporal stabilities of .87. In addition, the
manual reports internal consistency coefficients (Cronbach's alpha) ranging from .68-.87 for the
16 primary factors.
Procedure
The archival data from participants was separated into three groups for comparison. The
current graduate students completed the 1 6PF twice as an assignment for a course in personality
assessment: once as a course exercise where they scored their own 16PF profiles and learned
how to interpret them, and once responding as though they were applying for admission into the
program and wanted to appear as an ideal candidate (essentially, faking good). These two
conditions comprise two of the three experimental groups. In the Classroom condition,
participants were read the conventional 16PF directions. In the latter fake-good Analog
condition, participants were read the following script:
"For this session, disregard the instructions in your test booklet asking you to respond
honestly and in the way which best describes you. Instead, imagine that you are applying
for an internship or your first job as a school psychologist and that this test is part of the
interview process. You want this position very much, and you know this prospective
employer is looking for only those individuals who are best suited to the demands of the
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position. Respond to the questions so as to make yourself look as good as possible to the
interviewers. Remember, you want to appear as an ideal candidate for a school
psychology position that you really want to
get."
The purpose of this class assignment is to provide students with an understanding of the
use and interpretation ofpersonality measures as well as the potential threats to validity
associated with such measures.
The third condition used data from applicants to the program taking the 1 6PF as part of
the standard admissions process; an applied situation assumed to produce a high motivation to
fake one's responses for the better. Thus, three groups will be formed: students in a neutral self-
evaluative condition (Classroom), students positively faking responses in an analog condition
(Analog), and applicants with high motivation to positively fake responses in an applied
condition (Applicant).
Data Analysis
Data obtained from participants was first used to calculate means and standard deviations
for each of the three groups (Classroom, Analog, and Applicant). Following this descriptive
analysis, mean differences between groups were evaluated using three sets of t-tests.
Comparisons between the Classroom and Applicant groups, and the Analog and Applicant
groups, were conducted using independent measures t-tests, while comparisons between
Classroom and Analog groups were made using dependent measures t-tests.
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Results
Means and standard deviations from the descriptive analyses are displayed in Table 1 and
Table 2 for Primary and Global factors, respectively. Primary factor mean differences from all
three comparisons are shown in Table 3, and mean differences in Global factor scores can be
found in Table 4.
The results of t-tests comparing the Classroom and Applicant groups yielded significant
differences on four Primary factors: C: Emotional Stability (fa= 3.28, p<002), E: Dominance
(t64= 3.95, p<.002), F: Liveliness (t64= 4.36, p<002), and H: Social Boldness fa = 4.03,
p<.002). Significant differences were also found on the Extraversion (fa = 4.07, p<.002) and
Independence (fa = 4.73, p<.002) Global factors.
Results of t-tests conducted between the Analog and Applicant groups showed significant
differences on nine of the Primary factors: C: Emotional Stability (fa = 7.60, p<.002), F:
Liveliness (fa = -3.69, p<.002), G: Rule-Consciousness (fa = 6.83, p<002), H: Social Boldness
(fa = 3.93, p<002), L: Vigilance (fa = -3.50, p<.002), O: Apprehension (t^ = -8.04, p<002),
Q2: Self-Reliance (fa = -3.99, p<.002), and Q4: Tension (t57.i9 = -14.13, p<.002). The groups
also differed significantly on the Impression Management (IM) scale (t4i.6o= 8.84, p<.002) and
two of the Global factors: Anxiety (t^ = -12.17, p<.002) and Self-Control (fa = 5.78, p<002).
The dependent measures comparison between the Classroom and Analog groups revealed
significant differences on several factors. Ten Primary scales differed significantly: A: Warmth
(t27 = -4.28, p<.002), C: Emotional Stability (t27 = -8.82, p<.002), G: Rule-Consciousness (t27 = -
13.62, p<.002), H: Social Boldness (t27 = -7.61, p<.002), L: Vigilance (t27 = 4.76, p<.002), O:
Apprehension (t27 = 10.48, p<002), Ql: Openness to Change (t27 = -3.47, p<002), Q2: Self-
Reliance (t27 = 6.50, p<.002), Q3: Perfectionism (t27 = -6.51, p<.002), and Q4: Tension (t27 =
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1 1 .88, p<002). Significant differences were also found on the Impression Management scale
(t25 = -9.86, p<.002), and the Extraversion (t27 = -5.79, p<.002), Anxiety (t27 = -15.29, p<.002),
Tough-Mindedness (t27 = 3.75, p<.002), Independence (t27 = -5.02, p<.002), and Self-Control (t27
=
-9.37, p<.002) Global factors.
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Discussion
The results of the present analyses give rise to some interesting findings. As Table 3
indicates, the two groups with the lowest number of significant differences (p<.002) between
them across Primary and Global factors were the Honest Classroom and Applicant groups. Only
four Primary (C, E, F, and H) and two Global (EX and IN) factors showed significant differences
between the two experimental groups. In addition, the mean IM scales of the two groups were
not found to be significantly different. By contrast, nine Primary (C, F, G, H, L, O, Q2, Q3, and
Q4) and two Global factors (AX and SC) differed significantly between the Analog Classroom
and Applicant groups. The IM scales of the two groups were also significantly different. The
comparisons between the Honest Classroom and Analog Classroom groups yielded the highest
number of significant differences: ten Primary factors (A, C, G, H, L, O, Ql, Q2, Q3, and Q4),
all five Global factors (EX, AX, TM, IN, and SC), and the IM score. These findings seem to
suggest that the profiles of the Honest Classroom and Applicant groups are relatively similar,
while neither group's profiles closely approximate those obtained from the Analog Classroom
group. This basic pattern of similarities and differences among the three experimental groups
was not entirely unexpected. One could likely safely assume that the Honest and Analog
Classroom groups would differ substantially, especially given the specific directions used with
each respective group. Further, if one has any faith at all in the usefulness ofpersonality
measures in applied settings, one would also likely assume that the Applicant group's profiles
would be more similar to honest
test-takers' than they would be to
test-takers'
specifically
instructed to fake their responses. However, inspection beyond solely statistically significant
differences reveals another overall trend between the groups warranting further inspection.
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Looking at the mean scale scores for the three experimental groups in Tables 1 and 2, a
consistent pattern of rank-ordering among the groups emerges. Specifically, assuming that the
scores of the Analog Classroom group represent the ideal, or most desirable, characteristics for
school psychology graduate students, the mean scale scores of the groups tend to move from
least desirable to most desirable in the following pattern: Honest Classroom: least desirable,
Applicant: more desirable, Analog Classroom: most desirable. This pattern is further elaborated
visually in Figure 1 .
Before continuing the exploration of this trend, it should be noted that
"ideal"
scores in
this case, are not necessarily high scores. The factors of the 16PF, and the constructs they
represent, are bipolar, with the desirable end of the continuum defined by the given situation.
For example, in the case at hand, higher scores on theWarmth (A) factor were found to be more
desirable (as determined by the Analog Classroom group), while on the Tension (Q4) factor,
lower scores were more desirable.
While the differences between the groups are not all statistically significant, particularly
between the Honest Classroom and Applicant groups, the consistency of the pattern across the
Primary and Global factors makes it worthy of consideration. Referring once again to Tables 1
and 2 and Figure 1, the results of the present study show that the obtained mean scores of 12 of
the 16 Primary factors, and all five of the Global factors follow this general trend. The factors
that do not fit the pattern are Reasoning (B), Dominance (E), Liveliness (F), and Abstractedness
(M).
In the case of the Reasoning factor, in addition to not following the pattern, none of the
three
groups'
mean scores differed significantly from one another. This is likely due to the
problem-solving nature and content of the Reasoning scale. It is the only component of the 16PF
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with pre-determined
"correct"
answers, making it difficult to
"fake" in a positive way. Further,
the Reasoning factor is one of the few 16PF Primary factors that is not significantly correlated
with the Impression Management (IM) scale (Conn & Reike, 1 994), suggesting that when
individuals distort their responses on the 1 6PF to attempt to appear more desirable, the
Reasoning factor remains largely unaffected. This latter point is also true with regard to the
Dominance factor, but past research suggests that there may be more to consider when searching
for the reasons behind the Dominance factor's (and other 16PF factors lacking the
"right/wrong"
format of the Reasoning factor's test items) non-compliance with the observed overall pattern.
Recalling the findings ofpast researchers discussed in the introductory section of the
present study, particularly those ofWallbrown, Reuter, and Barnett (1989) and Merydith,
Humphreys, and Ebener (1997), it has been found that in some applied settings, the Primary
factors correlated with measures ofmotivational distortion do not necessarily exactly match the
correlations found in the normative sample of the test authors. For example, Merydith and
colleagues (1997) found that when working with a sample ofWelfare recipients, the Dominance
(E) factor of the 16PF form C was correlated with the Motivational Distortion (MD) scale, but
that the instrument lacked any correction procedures to account for distortion on that particular
factor. In sum, it seems that the lack of a significant correlation between elevated IM scores and
any given Primary or Global factor in the normative sample of the 16PF is not necessarily a good
predictor of such correlations in applied settings. Therefore, alternate reasoning is required to
account for the failure of the Dominance, Liveliness, and Abstractedness factors to conform to
the overall pattern at the heart of this discussion. However, that alternate line of reasoning may
be closely intertwined with the failure of IM scale correlations alone to create a feasible
explanation.
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The findings of studies such as Merydith et al. (1997) lend support to Cattell's (1968,
1986) claims regarding the effects ofvarying testing situations on response styles. Cattell
asserted that different testing situations carried with them different styles of faking necessary to
appear desirable or undesirable in that particular situation. Thus, it seems that a more tenable
explanation for the Dominance, Liveliness, and Abstractedness factors' deviation from the
overall pattern may be that these factors are incorporated differently into the faking styles
elicited by the situations presented by the present study. Specifically, it seems possible that the
applicant situation elicited a stronger desire to appear assertive, proactive, and energetic
(Dominance and Liveliness) than the analog situation. Therefore perhaps being in a real-life
applicant situation draws out these desirable "candidate" traits, whereas being in an analog
situation causes test-takers to concentrate more on traits desirable for actually being a school
psychologist. Further, it also seems possible that test takers were unclear regarding the role of
the Abstractedness factor as it applied to the situations they found themselves in, thus leading to
largely neutral responding, and accounting for the lack of significant differences between groups
on this factor.
With the exceptions to the observed overall pattern of increasing desirability examined,
the present discussion can now focus directly on the pattern itself. Once again, the majority of
the 16PF Primary and Global factor scores follow a general pattern of increasing desirability
from the Honest Classroom group, to the Applicant group, and finally to the Analog Classroom
group. In addition, based on the magnitudes of the differences between the groups, it appears
that the Honest Classroom group's scores were the least desirable, the Applicant group's scores
were slightly more desirable than those of the Honest Classroom group, and the Analog
Classroom group's scores were considerably more desirable than those of the Applicant group.
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To explain the significance of this pattern of differences, one must recall the existing theories on
response distortion described in previous sections of this work.
Cattell (1968) and Paulhus and Reid (1991) described response distortions as stemming
from two primary sources, thus giving rise to two basic forms of distortion. The first, self-
deception, is theorized to be the result of an unconscious reaction to the test-taking situation.
Impression management, the second form of distortion, consists of an intentional attempt to
make oneself appear a particular way. In accordance with these existing theories, it is proposed
here that the pattern of increasingly desirable scores found in the present study provides an
illustration of the existence of, and the differences between, two separate types of response
distortion that may closely approximate the preceding descriptions of self-deception and
impression management. Specifically, using the Honest Classroom group's scores as a baseline,
if the significantly elevated scores obtained from the Analog Classroom group are the result of
impression management (since the instructions given to that group were consistent with the
definition of impression management), the less significant, but consistent-across-groups
elevation of the Applicant group's scores may very well stem from the unconscious response
distortion that is characteristic of self-deception. At the very least, it seems probable that the
differences between the Honest Classroom and Applicant groups and the differences between the
Honest Classroom and Analog Classroom groups rise from sources, or types/styles of faking,
that are qualitatively and/or quantitatively different. This suggestion is consistent with the
findings ofZickar and Robie (1999), who noted that faking in applied, real-world settings, was
likely much more subtle than the instructed faking examined by their, and other analog
experimental designs. In addition, these findings lend support to Cattell's (1968,1986) theory
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that different testing situations assert different effects on the types of response distortions present
in each unique situation.
Based on the findings of the present study, it appears that the practice of using analog
research designs to evaluate response distortion in self-report personality assessment may be
prone to Cattell's "Third Error Source" (Cattell, 1986). That is, the analog paradigm seems to be
failing to take into account all the complexities involved in response distortion and thereby
misinterpreting the overwhelmingly positive findings regarding the validity of the distortion
detection measures in question. In particular, the results of the present study indicate that not
only are there likely situational factors that need to be accounted for, as Cattell and others have
suggested, there also appear to be issues regarding the subtlety and source of distortions that
warrant a significant degree of concern. By implication then, it seems that researchers evaluating
the validity of response distortion detection measures need to take some degree of caution when
interpreting the results of analog studies. Further, there may be cause to develop more sensitive
techniques for evaluating both response distortion and the measures designed to detect it.
Another facet of issue surrounding response distortion and its detection is what precisely
to do about it when it is found. When blatant impression management/faking is detected, it
seems prudent to throw out the results, or at least interpret them with extreme caution. The
numerous significant differences between the classroom and analog groups in this study show
the disparities between the profiles of those who fake good and those who (presumably) do not.
However, the consistent, but often not statistically significant differences between the applicant
group and classroom groups pose a less obvious situation. While this study has provided
evidence suggesting that some response distortion occurs undetected in applied situations, the
question eventually becomes one of significance and meaning. That is, does the less intense
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distortion found in the applicant group necessitate correction during profile interpretation? The
scores obtained in the present study seem to indicate that by and large, the shape of the profile
remains the same, as if a constant value was added/subtracted across factors. If the shape of the
profile, or the magnitude of the factor scores relative to each other, remains the same, it seems
that the obtained profile would still be highly usable, or even statistically the same, as the
presumably honest profile. Further, if the slight elevations in factor scores for applicants are as
consistent as the results of the present study suggest, perhaps it is more meaningful when an
applicant profile lacks this mild elevation in scores. What does it say about an individual when
his or her personality does not react to the situational variables present in a job/program
application situation? These are questions that could be addressed in further extension and
replication of this line of research.
In addition, the present study is limited by a relatively small sample size and the use of
only one measure ofpersonality in a single applied setting. Replication of this study/design with
larger sample sizes is needed to further establish the credibility of the present findings. Future
research should include multiple personality instruments from both normal and abnormal (i.e.,
MMPI-2) domains, and should investigate the stability of these findings across various applied
situations.
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Table 1
Primary FactorMeans and StandardDeviations Across Conditions
Classroom Analog Applicant
(n = 22) (n = 22) (n = 38)
Factor/Scale M SD M SD M SD
A: Warmth 5.89 1.52 7.50 1.00 6.79 1.30
B: Reasoning 6.46 1.45 6.75 1.32 6.26 1.22
C: Emotional Stability 5.14 1.72 8.00 0.00 6.37 1.32
E: Dominance 3.93 1.25 5.00 1.25 5.11 1.16
F: Liveliness 5.43 1.29 5.82 1.12 6.89 1.39
G: Rule-Consciousness 4.39 1.13 7.93 1.46 5.42 1.48
H: Social Boldness 4.61 1.69 7.93 1.25 6.37 1.81
I: Sensitivity 5.36 2.31 6.32 1.49 5.84 1.70
L: Vigilance 4.71 1.38 3.32 1.12 4.66 1.78
M: Abstractedness 4.68 1.72 4.57 0.74 5.00 1.59
N: Privateness 4.46 1.86 4.00 1.31 4.13 1.70
O: Apprehension 5.79 1.23 2.79 1.23 5.71 1.61
Ql: Openness to Change 5.89 1.73 7.18 1.47 6.58 1.55
Q2: Self-Reliance 4.89 1.50 2.93 1.12 4.24 1.44
Q3: Perfectionism 4.79 1.55 7.46 1.17 6.08 i.85
Q4: Tension 5.36 1.47 2.18 0.48 4.71 0.96
IM: ImpressionManagement 44.19 27.08 96.14 5.30 60.97 23.78
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Table 2
Global FactorMeans and StandardDeviations Across Conditions
Classroom Analog Applicant
(n = 22) (n = 22) (n = 38)
Factor M SD M SD M SD
EX: Extraversion 5.91 1.45 7.90 1.05 7.27 1.26
AX: Anxiety 5.44 1.44 1.38 0.73 4.62 1.26
TM: Tough-Mindedness 5.56 1.57 4.18 1.31 4.73 1.42
IN: Independence 4.21 1.32 6.00 1.26 5.68 1.18
SC: Self-Control 5.02 1.20 7.42 1.02 5.52 1.50
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Table 3
Mean Differences Between Comparison Groups Across Primary Factors
Factor/Scale
Classroom -
applicant
(n = 60)
Analog-
applicant
(n = 60)
Classroom -
analog
(n = 22)
A: Warmth 0.90 0.71 1.61*
B: Reasoning -0.20 0.49 0.29
C: Emotional Stability 1.23* 1.63* 2.86*
E: Dominance 1.18* -0.11 1.07
F: Liveliness 1.47* -1.07*0.39
G: Rule-Consciousness 1.03 2.51* 3.54*
H: Social Boldness 1.76* 1.56* 3.32*
I: Sensitivity 0.48 0.48 0.96
L: Vigilance -0.06 -1.34*-1.39*
M: Abstractedness 0.32 -0.43 -0.11
N: Privateness -0.33 -0.13 -0.46
0: Apprehension -0.08
Ql: Openness to Change 0.69 0.60
1.29*
Q2: Self-Reliance -0.66
Q3: Perfectionism 1.29 1.39*
2.67*
Q4: Tension -0.65
IM: ImpressionManagement 16.75 35.17*
51.85*
* p<.002
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Table 4
Mean Differences Between Comparison GroupsAcross Global Factors
Factor
Classroom -
applicant
(n = 60)
Analog -
applicant
(n = 60)
Classroom -
analog
(n = 22)
EX: Extraversion 1.36* 0.63 1.989*
AX: Anxiety -0.82 -3.24*-4.06*
TM: Tough-Mindedness -0.83 -0.55 -1.37*
IN: Independence 1.47* 0.32 1.78*
SC: Self-Control 0.50 1.90* 2.40*
p<.002
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Figure Caption
Figure 1. Mean primary and global factor scores across groups.
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